The downfall of the Mughal Empire in North India, began in 1679 with Emperor Aurangzeb's war against the Rajputs of Marwar and Mewar, the re-imposition of the jaziya tax on the Hindu population and the order commanding the destruction of their temples. The wars and rebellions spread across a vast area, destroying the economy, and leaving faraway Mughal provinces outside the firm grip of the emperor. The Great Anarchy had been brought into North India....all through Aurangzeb's bigoted policies. And this had happened even as he toiled in the wars of the Indian Peninsula, which meant that the turbulent north provided an easy advance for the subsequent Maratha expansion.
Eastern India, namely the regions of Orissa, Bengal, and Bihar, had an interesting and often ignored history of both the Mughal collapse and the Maratha expansion.
Aurangzeb, who never visited Bengal, called it a "hell full of bread." A hell, because of the muggy heat that prevailed through most of the year in that province, and "full of bread" because the same climate ensured plentiful rain for the fertile land. During the monsoon season the rain and the flooded rivers made the land practically impassable in the medieval era. Bihar on the northwest of Bengal, shares its terrain and climate but not its history (see the eastern regions).
Orissa, on the southwest, has an entirely different terrain and a very different history (see Bihar Nepal and Orissa). But with the Mughal conquest, the three regions of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa come to have a common administration......every powerful or efficient Mughal Subahdar of Bengal would have one or both of the other provinces joined to his charge by the emperor.
The Mughal conquest of Bengal from the Afghans had a bloody beginning but Raja Man Singh successfully pacified the regionAurangzeb's bigotry and the eastern regions
The eastern regions had enjoyed more peace and prosperity relative to the other war-ridden parts of India. The Mughals here had fought most wars on the frontiers, against the Ahoms, against the Cheros of the Palamau plateau, and against the Rajas of Arakan who supported the Mag and Feringi pirates of Chittagong. In August 1668 a cyclone was the cause of some devastation, from which the provinces recovered, but man-made storms are a bigger cause of misery than natural calamities!
Aurangzeb's revival of strict Islamic ordinances like the jaziya tax, the pilgrimage tax, and the policy of temple destruction, all of which created such a storm in other parts of India and brought on The Great Anarchy, had their impact in the east. Thus the Muraqat-i-Abul Hasan records (circa 1670):
The emperor learning from news-letters of the province of Orissa that at the village of Tilkuti in Medinipur (modern Midnapore) a temple has been built, has issued his august mandate for its destruction, and the destruction of all temples built anywhere in this province by the worthless infidels. Every idol-house built during the last 10 or 12 years, whether with brick or clay, should be demolished without delay. Also do not allow the crushed Hindus and despicable infidels to repair their old temples.
A temple of poor villagers was not allowed to stand, and officers were deputed to destroy even temples made of clay! New temples could not be built and old temples could not be repaired, which meant that with the vagaries of time they would crumble, and thus the Hindu religion would be wiped out. A letter dated 27 June 1672, in the temple of Yasho-Madhav, far in the eastern part (near Dhaka) of Bengal reads:
In every district officers have come with the orders from the emperor for the destruction of idols.
In Orissa temples and the numerous Hindu States in that province were attacked. The impact of this policy was felt even after Aurangzeb's death. In 1732 the deputy governor of Orissa, Taqui Khan, attacked the temple of Jagannath Puri but the priests took away the deities to the safety of an island in the vast Chilka Lake. Taqui Khan then attacked the Raja of Khurda, who was the hereditary custodian of Jagannath Puri, and forcibly converted him to Islam.
It is not clear what the reaction of the local inhabitants was to these acts. Apart from these examples, it is also not clear how strictly the local officials implemented Aurangzeb's policy. The instances portrayed above are taken from the Mughal texts of Aurangzeb's reign; stories of the Hindu resistance to temple destruction in those texts have come from Khandela (in Shekhawati), Ujjain (in Malwa), and Orchcha (in Bundelkhand). When Aurangzeb invaded Rajputana, instances of temple destruction and the resistance, find mention in Mughal texts. Subsequently, when he invaded the Deccan, again stories of attacks on temples and the resistance by the locals fill those texts.
The point is, the stories of resistance to temple-destruction in the Mughal texts come mostly from places where Aurangzeb personally led armies, or from places close to the Mughal capitals of Delhi and Agra. Which means that his orders were most effectively implemented in these regions, and resistance was strongest in these areas. There is one instance in the Mughal texts where Rajputs in Malwa forcibly plucked out the beard and moustaches of a Mughal official who tried to collect the jaziya tax from their village. The lack of any more such instances in those texts, does not mean that resistance to the bigoted tax did not happen in any other village in Malwa, or in any other region of India!
Violent risings
Apart from the religious violence by the bigoted Mughal officials in Bengal, and long before the Maratha invasions; the future rulers of the province, the English East India Company also indulged in war and rapine. In 1686, while Aurangzeb was engrossed in his Deccan wars, the Company went to war in Bengal over the corruption of the local Mughal officials and a financial dispute with Indian merchants, sacking and burning the town of Hughli before being expelled by the Mughal army. Their army of 400 had Englishmen, Portuguese half-breeds, Rajput mercenaries (which means Purbias of UP-Bihar), and four ships. After a brief lull in 1688 they seized the town of Balasore, and committed great atrocities on "Christians and non-Christians, men and women alike". But the Mughals captured the merchants and civilians of the company, forcing the English to come to terms in 1690.
In 1696 from the Orissa border, Shova Singh, the Zamindar of Chatwa-Barda made an alliance with Rahim Khan the leader of the Afghans settled in Orissa and invaded the lands of the Raja of Burdwan. Shova Singh's family were Chauhan Rajputs who had settled in Bengal, while the Rajas of Burdwan were descended from an older family of Punjabi merchants. It is not clear what caused this rising. Was it a dispute over revenue collection, border conflicts between the two zamindaries, or the opportunity presented by Aurangzeb being bogged down in the Deccan wars and his Bengal governor being of mild disposition?
The governor Ibrahim Khan adopted the timid policy of letting small forces under local officers and zamindars tackle the invaders from Orissa. Consequently every victory boosted the confidence of Shova Singh and Rahim Khan and added more and more adventurers and vagabonds to their army, which increased to 10,000 cavalry and 60,000 infantry. They spread all over the fertile land, looting and burning, forcing people to join them in raiding the rich cities of Bengal. The raiders were finally defeated in 1698. One major consequence of this violent uprising was the permission given to the European factories at Chandernagar (French), Chinsura (Dutch), and Calcutta (English) to fortify their settlements and enlist Indian soldiers (mostly Purbia infantry) for their protection.
Alivardi Khan
Aurangzeb had sent his grandson Azim-ush-shan to subdue the Shova Singh-Rahim Khan rising, and had appointed him the new governor of Bengal. But at the capital Dhaka Azim-us-shan planned to murder the Diwan (revenue official) Murshid Quli and enrich himself. Murshid Quli then moved his residence to a village on the banks of the Ganga further west and renamed it Murshidabad after himself——this became the future capital of Bengal while Aurangzeb ordered his grandson to vacate the province. By 1704 Aurangzeb had added the Diwani of Bihar to Murshid Quli's charge of Bengal, in addition to his military post of Faujdar of Orissa.
In 1717 the next Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar recognized Murshid Quli as governor of Bengal and Orissa, in addition to being the Diwan of these provinces. His successors Shuja and Sarfaraz inherited this position, the former being also given the province of Bihar in 1733. Such a concetration of hereditary powers in provincial governors had never been a feature of the Mughal Empire. What had always been permanent features in the empire though were war, treachery, and murder for the sake of position and power, and these inevitably erupted in Bengal.
Alivardi Khan, a Shia officer holding Bihar as a deputy rebelled against Sarfaraz, killed him in battle, and made himself Nawab in 1740. He gained recognition of this act of usurpation from the emperor through bribery. Rustam Jang, brother-in-law of Sarfaraz and his deputy in Orissa, advanced with an army against Alivardi but was defeated at Balasore. While Alivardi occupied the Orissa capital Cuttack, Rustam Jang took shelter with the Nizam of Hyderabad——an army of Maratha mercenaries hired by his partisans recovered Orissa in 1741 but were again defeated by Alivardi in December. The nawab spent some months in settling the administration of Orissa and sending detachments against some of the independent Hindu states in the province, like Mayurbhanj.
Alivardi Khan, Nawab of Bengal Bihar and OrissaThe Marathas of Nagpur
Towards the end of his life, Aurangzeb had attempted to solve the Maratha problem by releasing the son of dead Maratha king, so that the different Maratha chieftains would gather around him and Aurangzeb could then make a definite peace with this ruler Shahu. But even after his death, though Shahu was set free and eventually became sole ruler of the Marathas, as well as a Mughal mansabdar, the situation could never return to the days of the centralized rule of Shivaji.
Shahu, having spent his entire youth in captivity, lacked the military ability or financial resources to bring each Maratha chieftain under his control. His own administration and army were actually in the hands of his Brahman Peshwas....so Shahu distributed the various parts of the Deccan within reach of the Maratha cavalry to the different chieftains, which they could then tax, plunder, or annex. Under this scheme the Berar region in eastern Maharashtra passed into the hands of the Bhonsle family.
Raghuji Bhonsle captured neighbouring Nagpur from the Gonds and made it his capital. To the east of Nagpur, and across the hills and jungles of Chattisgarh, lay the coastal cities of Orissa and further north-east the fertile lands of Bengal. Alivardi Khan's enemies in Orissa promised to aid any Maratha attack, and so Raghuji sent an army under Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar against the Nawab.
Raghuji and the Peshwa
Moving through the hills and jungles of Chattisgarh and Orissa the Maratha army, estimated at 10,000 light cavalry, surprised Alivardi's army at Burdwan (April 1742). They plundered the villages around so that no grain could reach the Nawab's army, and the latter were forced to march and fight their way to safety, all the while enveloped by a cloud of Maratha cavalry which was only kept at bay by the artillery and the Purbia foot-musketeers. Then leaving the Mughals toiling behind them, the Marathas made a dash on the Bengal capital Murshidabad and plundered it; looting from the house of the leading merchant (Fatechand) 3 lakh rupees. For the monsoon months the Nawab took post at his capital while the Marathas were stationed in Katwa.
Mir Habib, a Persian officer and rival of the Nawab, became the chief advisor to the Marathas in their eastern campaigns. He helped them in capturing Hugli fort and became their chief agent in Bengal, collecting land revenue from villages in his reach. Towards the close of the monsoon, as the river levels began to recede, reinforcements reached Alivardi Khan who surprised the Maratha camp in Katwa during a night attack and forced them to flee. From every other place scattered bodies of Maratha cavalry retired beyond the Chilka Lake, after plundering and burning the villages (December 1742).
Before this victory, Alivardi Khan had sent appeals for aid to the emperor at Delhi, who had first sent Safdar Jang of Awadh.....not to help Alivardi but to secure Bihar while Alivardi, the usurper of the eastern provinces, was locked in a struggle with the Marathas. Safdar Jang's strong army also committed great atrocities on the people of Bihar on its march to Patna. But by this time Alivardi had expelled Bhaskar's men from Bengal and part of Orissa, so Safdar Jang quickly retired to his own province.
The emperor had also appealed for aid to the new Peshwa, Balaji Rao, knowing him to be a hereditary rival of the Nagpur family. Alivardi Khan had to pay a high price for the Peshwa's help; the chauth (quarter of the surplus revenue) of his provinces for Raja Shahu to be collected by the Peshwa, and 22 lakh Rupees in cash for the expenses of Balaji's army.
The two allies then marched against Raghuji and defeated him; relative peace lasted in the eastern provinces till March 1744. In the meantime Raghuji and Peshwa Balaji Rao met at Raja Shahu's court, who created a fresh distribution of the eastern provinces (August 1743) to settle the rivalry between them. In other words the Peshwa's agreement with Alivardi Khan was nullified.
When Bhaskar reappeared with his army in 1744, Alivardi was bewildered, and realised that the Marathas had double crossed him. His Afghan general, Mustafa Khan, proposed to bring Bhaskar and his chiefs to a friendly interview and massacre them, in return for being appointed governor of Bihar. This was done at the end of March. Bhaskar and 21 chiefs, which included two Muslims named Shahamat Khan and Alibhai Qarawwal, and twenty other soldiers were massacred in the Nawab's tent and their leaderless army fled back to Nagpur.
Mir Habib
The Nagpur Raja was not in a position to avenge the murder of his chieftains because of financial troubles, and a fresh outbreak of his conflict with the Peshwa. On the other side Alivardi Khan was also bankrupt. Because of these money problems the Nawab now hesitated to give the governorship of Bihar to Mustafa Khan, who at great personal risk had massacred Bhaskar and his chieftains. Mustafa resigned his service (Feb 1745), intending to take Bihar by force, and invited Raghuji Bhonsle to cooperate with him in defeating Alivardi. Raghuji at the head of 14,000 cavalry took Orissa while Mustafa assaulted Patna with his Afghan army....after Mustafa's death Raghuji moved to Bihar (August 1745). The united Marathas and Afghans plundered Bihar while Alivardi marched from Mushidabad to fight them.
In their repeated invasions of Bengal, the Marathas plundered and killed the mostly Hindu populace, while their armies contained many Muslims. Hence this alliance with Afghans was hardly surprising.
In January 1748 the rebel Afghan soldiers captured Patna and invited the Marathas to join them; the Afghans committed atrocities on the inhabitants of the city.
According to a contemporary Muslim observer, "Plunder and sack by the Ruhelas raged in the city and its environs; the life, property, and family honour of multitudes were destroyed, and the signs of doomdsay appeared."
The Afghans even humiliated the Nawab's daughter and her children by parading them in a bullock cart around the city. Sunk in grief and rage Alivardi marched with his army against the united Afghans and Marathas. At the Battle of Ranisarai, his artillery and musketeers decimated the Afghan contingent, which was followed by a regular charge on them by his army. Even when the Marathas under Janoji and Mir Habib plundered his baggage, the Nawab ignored them and concentrated his efforts against the Afghans who had the bigger army.
After his victory (April 1748) Alivardi appointed his grandson Siraj-ud-daulah to hold Patna. In March 1749 he made an attempt to recover Orissa. At his approach Mir Habib fled from Medinipur and the Nawab captured Cuttack. Both sides were now tired of the ceaseless wars, Alivardi because of his age and the frequent rebellions that were sapping his armed strength, and the Marathas because they were making no real gains with their cavalry raids, except destroying the revenue and uprooting the people of eastern India.
So in March 1751 Alivardi deputed Mir Jafar to open peace negotiations. Mir Jafar discussed the draft proposal with Mir Habib, which was then ratified by Raghuji Bhonsle at Nagpur:
By this treaty Mir Habib became once again an officer of Alivardi and was installed as the deputy governor of the province of Orissa. He was required to pay the entire surplus revenue of the province to Raghuji's army as their salary, but the border of Orissa and Bengal was drawn at the Subarnarekha River, which meant that Medinipur now became a part of Bengal. From the rest of his dominion Alivardi would pay chauth amounting to 12 lakh rupees to Raghuji.
Mir Habib governed Orissa for about 14 months, after which the Marathas formed a plot to get rid of him, as he was now an officer of Alivardi and denied the full control of Orissa to his old allies. Mir Habib and his chief followers were killed in Janoji's tent in August 1752, after which the Marathas annexed Orissa.
Marathas and the English
Calcutta in 1786; the old fort can be seen on the left"On the Marathas return we, on 17th March (1743), ordered the batteries to be put in good order and entertained a hundred Buxaris. We raised a militia of the inhabitants on 4th April. The merchants proposed at their own expense to dig a ditch round the town to secure their houses," quoted from a letter by the English merchants describing the defensive measures taken at Calcutta during the Maratha incursions. Buxar is a district of Bihar, and the term Buxari refers to Hindu musketeers, known later as Purbias in the East India Company army. The digging of a ditch was meant to deter the advance of cavalry, and became known as the Mahratta Ditch.
The Europeans had been permitted to fortify their settlements during the Shova Singh rising, and among them the English had actually fought a war with Mughals before that. Alivardi's usurpation, the Maratha incursions, and the Afghan rebellions removed the authority of the Nawab from large parts of Bengal, and encouraged lawless elements to engage in plunder. These factors prompted the English to protect their trade convoys with military escorts, increasing the armed power of the trading company.
Alivardi Khan died in 1756 and was succeeded as Nawab by his temperamental grandson Siraj-ud-daulah. Siraj's conflict with the East India Company ended with the well-known Battle of Plassey the next year and the installation of Mir Jafar, Alivardi's right-hand man as the new Nawab. Leftist historians with their heads buried in the sand (as usual) have portrayed Mir Jafar as a "traitor" and Robert Clive as "unscrupulous", but such behaviour was quite normal in the history of the Mughal Empire; and seen in the above context, Alivardi's usurpation set the example for his ambitious officers like Mir Habib, Mir Jafar, Siraj, and the Afghan chieftains.
Even though Orissa had come under Maratha occupation, they could never forget that the northern portion of the province, Medinipur had been annexed into Bengal. Therefore small bands of Maratha soldiers would cross the border into Balesar and menace the Nawab's officers in Medinipur. However the chauth for Bengal and Bihar was regularly paid by the Nawabs till 1758, after which the English who now controlled the Nawab, stopped payment. They opened negotiations with the Nagpur court for an assurance that no Maratha force would make incursions into the Nawab's dominions.
Raghuji Bhonsle died in 1755 and was succeeded by his son Janoji. Financially weakened by the constant fighting in the eastern provinces, and militarily weakened by the wars with the Peshwa, Janoji could not control small-scale raiding by his local officers in Orissa. Hence no chauth was paid by the English to Janoji for the next five years.
In 1763 the English now in conflict with the titular Nawab Mir Qasim, asked Janoji to not help him in anyway, promising prompt payment of the chauth. Therefore Janoji refused Mir Qasim asylum in Orissa and in return the English paid him the Bengal and Bihar chauth for the next two years. But after the Battle of Buxar had given complete control of the eastern provinces to the East India Company, payment of this money to the Nagpur Raja was again stopped.
Instead Robert Clive now asked Janoji to cede Orissa to the English, in return for which he promised to pay the arrears of chauth and regular future payments. This offer was not acceptable to Janoji, even though he lacked the military and financial resources to make the British comply with the treaty signed by Alivardi Khan. The Bhonsles of Nagpur had not hired European adventurers to raise trained infantry battalions in the same manner as the Scindias of Gwalior.
Lord Cornwallis also opened negotiations for the cession of Orissa, because this would enable him to link up the British possesions in Tamil Nadu (Madras Carnatic) and coastal Andhra Pradesh (Northern Circars) with Bengal. In return he promised to exempt Maratha subjects from any government duties, during their pilgrimage to Hindu holy sites like Benares, Gaya, and Allahabad, which were all under British control. Cornwallis also considered bribing the Maratha officials at Nagpur, to achieve the cession of Orissa....but his attempts also ended in failure.
Ultimately Orissa was taken by the British in the second Anglo-Maratha War (1803). Read More......
