The political boundaries of the province of Baluchistan were marked out by the British in the 19th Century. In 1871 the Joint Perso-Baluch Boundary Commission drew a line across the deserts and mountains cutting off western Baluchistan from the Khanate of Kalat and leaving a small but concentrated Sunni Baloch population inside Shia Iran. In 1893 the Durand Line marked the boundaries between British India and Afghanistan—this left scattered Baloch tribes inside Afghanistan. Up to the Second World War the British were keeping their options open on their Indian Empire and were toying with the idea of an independent Baluchistan—until the Soviet victory over the Nazis.
The subsequent Soviet advance through Europe and the fear that a similar advance would tear through Central Asia and Afghanistan prompted the British to change their policies in India. To prevent Asia from falling to communism a strong state was needed to guard India’s northwest frontier. A state united by a common religion and populated by a race that had loyally served British interests—the Punjabi Muslims. The British looked on benignly as the new country sought to secure the headwaters of its main rivers by attacking the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. They were even more unconcerned when that country invaded the princely state of Kalat and effectively colonized Baluchistan. Since then many foreign countries have been interested in the troubled province—at different times and for different reasons.
Afghanistan: The modern country of Afghanistan is the remains of Ahmad Shah Abdali’s mid-eighteenth century empire and its early relations with the Baloch are noted elsewhere. The Afghans provided shelter and arms to their tribal brethren who wished to rebel against the Pakistanis and in this spirit they also welcomed the early Baloch rebels of the Kalat state. But land-locked Afghanistan never had the resources to take on Pakistan in a straight fight and was itself trapped between the Soviet Union on the one side and America’s Iranian and Pakistani allies on the other.
This tussle between the superpowers broke out into an open war in 1979 with Soviet troops entering Afghanistan—America and Pakistan provided open support to the Afghan rebels and also sent fanatics from the larger Muslim world to fight the Godless communist invaders[1]. Leaders of the Baloch war of 1973-77 had taken refuge in Afghanistan and these men naturally came under the Soviet influence—they were used to organize the BLA that began carrying out attacks within Baluchistan. In this fighting some of the Baloch tribes sided with American money and Pakistani ambitions while others either remained aloof or leaned towards the Soviet ideology. On its part the Soviet Union revived talk of a united Pashtun country called Pashtunistan to be linked to Greater Baluchistan in the south but nothing concrete came out of these threats. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 Pakistan encouraged Pashtun students from its own madrassas to pick up the gun and create a truly Islamic State in Afghanistan. During this time Baluchistan was home to thousands of Afghan refugees mostly of the Pashtun ethnicity and Quetta had become a staging area for the Taliban[2] and for numerous terrorist groups keen to create a pan-Islamic empire.
Baloch-Pashtun relations within the province also came under strain because the Pashtun now demanded either unification with their brethren in the frontier or a separate province for Pashtuns to be carved out of Baluchistan. But the Taliban rulers quickly became unpopular because of their corruption, indulgence in the drugs trade, religious and ethnic intolerance, and for their greed—this had an echo in Baluchistan. That province had seen ethnic tensions and sectarian strife rising in its towns and cities while the federal government had become internationally isolated and was bleeding itself in a proxy war against India in Jammu & Kashmir. The Baloch and the Pashtuns thus sank their differences and formed a united front with other ethnic minorities of Pakistan. The fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the formation of an internationally recognized government in Afghanistan have created new opportunities and threats for Baluchistan.
· Although there is nominal Baloch representation in the Afghan government and Balochi is a recognized national language in that country it is highly unlikely that Baluchistan proper will ever join with Afghanistan in a federation.
· Similarly with strong American presence in that troubled country it is equally unlikely that the Baloch rebels will be able to take refuge or buy arms and supplies in Afghanistan as in the past.
· The Afghans see Baluchistan today as just another place where the Taliban and the International Islamic Front are based—on the other hand the province provides an economic outlet to the sea for the eastern regions of Afghanistan. Reconstruction of its own political and military infrastructure and economic development are the main objectives of the new Afghanistan—only after the country truly stands on its feet will the policy towards neighbouring Baluchistan become clear.
Iran: By way of language and origins most of the people of Baluchistan have some links to the inhabitants of Iran but historically the Baloch have never considered themselves subjects of the Persian Shahs. It was only in the 19th Century that the Pahlavi dynasty began to acquire territory along the Makran coast and came into conflict with the local Baloch population—their aggression was sanctified in a treaty arranged by the British. As a western ally Reza Shah welcomed the formation of Pakistan and its annexation of Baluchistan. When the Baloch resistance turned into an open war in 1973 the Iranian Shah provided helicopter gunships flown by his own pilots to attack the hideouts of the Baloch rebels[3]. Iran and Pakistan worked closely together to first crush the rebellion and then pacify the population[4].
The Islamist revolution in 1979 created a Shia state in a sea of western-backed Sunni dictatorships and gave hope to the repressed Shia populations in those countries—the same was true for Pakistan. Only a few years later the military dictators of Pakistan altered their country’s constitution and introduced strict Islamic curricula into their school system. These two moves discriminated against the non-Sunni sects in Islam and sectarian strife over the coming decades would pit Sunni against Shia in a deadly and unending conflict. For the Sunni Baloch minority in Iran the situation had changed from bad to worse—they were provided arms by Iran’s enemies like Saddam Hussein to destabilize the usurping Ayatollah regime[5]. These events were however overshadowed by the superpower clash in Afghanistan in the 1980s—here Iran backed the Shia and the Dari-speaking groups against the Soviets and was thus nominally on the same side as the Americans. The subsequent rise of the Pakistan-backed Taliban and their brutal attacks on the Hazaras and Tajiks enraged the government of Iran and further ruined its tenuous relations with Pakistan.
· Iran is home to numerous Afghan refugees and provides the safest access to the sea for their land-locked country—it is alleged that the port of Gwadar and the roads being built to southern Afghanistan from that port will be a threat to Iran’s interests. There is no real evidence to back this claim. In any case western Afghanistan will always prefer the Iranian route for its reliability and access to the Gulf markets—moreover Iran itself is a huge market and source of energy and technology for Afghanistan’s development.
· It is also alleged that American military bases in Baluchistan are a threat to Iran and that country is thus behind the renewed Baloch militancy in the province. Again, since the Baloch have not attacked the American bases and such bases are also present in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq, and Turkey these allegations cannot be taken seriously.
· Iran and Pakistan had planned to open an oil refinery in southern Baluchistan, which was designed to refine tanker-delivered oil from Iran. To be named the Iran-Pak refinery the unit would have had a 50-50 ownership split between Pakistan’s Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation (PERAC) and Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The deal has not matured because of financial reasons[6].
· Over the years Iran has been rediscovering its splendid heritage going back to pre-Islamic times and considers itself a fountainhead of civilization for several Persian-speaking groups—including the Baloch. But an independent Baluchistan inhabited solely by the Baloch will create problems for Iran’s own Baloch dominated areas.
Gulf States: The Arab states have maritime boundaries with Baluchistan and are places where the Baloch migrate to in search of jobs. In earlier times while the Baloch embraced the religion of Islam they nevertheless resisted invading Arab armies and were never subjugated by those foreigners. Contact with Arab merchants by the sea continued till the Europeans began dominating the sea trade from the 15th Century. The Khan of Kalat gave the island of Gwadar to the Sultan of Oman in this period and in 1958 the Sultan’s descendant sold it back to Baluchistan’s new rulers—the government of Pakistan.
Grown fat on oil revenues the Arab elite became interested in Baluchistan in the 1970s for the Houbara Bustard—a flightless bird prized for its meat[7]. By 1972 the government of Pakistan had prohibited the local Baloch from hunting the bird but they issued special hunting permits for the privileged Arab dignitaries—these permits gave each Arab VIP thousands of square kilometres of territory as his own hunting ground. The VIPs in return built mosques for the local people, constructed airports and rest houses, and donated electricity generators and other equipment—the airports eventually became property of the Pakistan government. On several occasion the Arab hunting parties came into conflict with the Baloch tribesmen and had to be escorted and protected by federal forces. Arab oil revenues also caused a spurt in construction and other development activity in the Gulf—thousands of poor people migrated to the region from South Asia and North Africa to take a small slice of this pie.
Their repatriated earnings became a major source of foreign exchange for their home countries—at about the same time the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was founded by a Pakistani citizen with its main office in London. Backed by the ISI and western intelligence agencies this bank soaked up the repatriated earnings of overseas Pakistanis and the surplus capital of the oil-rich Arabs. Several Arab, European, and American dignitaries served on its Board of Directors and the BCCI quickly became involved in laundering dirty money and financing cash transfers for the covert operations of the directors’ home countries[8]. From the Iran-Contra scandal to the laundering of drug money from the Afghan jihad—the BCCI was neck-deep in the cesspool of criminal activity until its fraudulent business was exposed by the Bank of England and the bank collapsed in 1991. The same year saw the end of the First Gulf War, which had been preceded by the sudden expulsion of foreign workers from the region and was followed by the desire of Arab states to give employment to their own people in preference to foreigners.
· The recruitment of the Baloch has however continued in the armies and paramilitaries of these states and there are thousands of Baloch soldiers and officers living in the Gulf today[9].
· Since 2001 the hunting expeditions into Baluchistan have ended and Arab financing of religious schools and seminaries is also under international scrutiny. However Sheikh Khilafa Bin Zayed of UAE still owned the airstrip at Shamsi-Kharan that was used by the Americans during Enduring Freedom.
· Countries like Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are instead heavily invested in numerous infrastructure projects mostly in the territory of Baluchistan. These countries can also expect to benefit from the eventual trade to Central Asia via the port of Gwadar.
India: The shared history of India and Baluchistan and the ancient links between the two has been noted in Appendix I. Unlike the Khyber Pass in the Pashtun lands, the Bolan Pass of Baluchistan has very rarely been used by armies passing to and from India—instead it has more often served as a safe passage for trading caravans who were not harassed by the Baloch tribes as long as they paid the taxes for using the route. Indian merchants and administrators had taken up service under the Khans of Kalat in an early period and one Diwan Bucha Mull fought and gave his life in defending Kalat from the invading British in 1839[10]. Relations between the Hindu population and the majority Baloch have always been cordial. With the partition of India when the fate of the hundreds of princely states was to be decided, the Khan of Kalat tried to play both sides and enquired whether he could accede to India but the Indian leaders turned down his request since Kalat did not touch independent India’s border.
It seemed that there was a lack of knowledge about Baluchistan among the Indian peoples and government—unlike the familiarity that they had with Punjab, Sindh, and the Frontier. While the Baloch fought several battles against the Pakistan Army over the next three decades India neither raised the issue in bilateral talks with Pakistan nor was the plight of the Baloch ever highlighted among the international community. Even during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, Lal Bahadur Shastri the then Prime Minister of India raised the issues of only Pashtunistan and East Pakistan to counter the Pakistani propaganda on J&K[11]. Six years later East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh with the India-Pakistan war of 1971—after that conflict the Pakistan Army became engaged in a war with the Baloch.
This time the Indian leadership opened channels of communication with the Baloch people and allegedly ran training camps for some number of Baloch rebels in the western Indian state of Rajasthan[12]. These camps were eventually closed when the insurgency in Baluchistan had petered out and the new Indian government was anxious to improve relations with its neighbours. In 1971 India had signed a Treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and when that superpower sent its forces into Afghanistan the Indians made no protest—though it must be said that the fact of Pakistani interference in the affairs of Afghanistan must have influenced their stand on this issue. Covert contacts with the Baloch leadership may have been maintained through the agency of the Soviet Union, which was actively encouraging the Baloch to rebel in this period. Through the decade of the 90s India’s primary concern was the export of Islamist terrorism by groups that had been nurtured by Pakistan to fight the Afghan war.
· These groups had come together under the name of the International Islamic Front and had acquired bases and a following in all Pakistani provinces, including Baluchistan. Constituents of this grouping hijacked an Indian Airlines plane in 1999 and flew it to Kandahar demanding the release of their terrorist leaders from Indian prisons—to tackle such incidents in the future India will need to open and maintain contacts with recognized secular leaders among the Baloch and the Pashtuns.
· India’s growing economy can only be sustained by the import of large amounts of oil and gas, which can be cheaply and efficiently delivered through pipelines. The source of this natural wealth are Iran, Qatar, and Central Asia and the pipelines that carry such wealth will all pass through Baluchistan—the security of these pipelines is another Indian concern.
· India is deeply engaged in the rebuilding of post-Taliban Afghanistan and is investing capital and technology in Central Asian countries. Were Baluchistan to become an independent country or an autonomous part of a Pakistan federation then another rich market and source of energy will be opened up for India. Such a federation would also mean that the Pakistan Army would be unable to utilize the resources of Sindh, Baluchistan, and the Frontier in military adventures against India.
USA: The British aim of creating Pakistan to serve as a bulwark against communism with a professional army in charge, was understood and much appreciated by the United States, which was taking over the responsibilities of former colonial empires. The US made Pakistan a member of anti-communist military alliances (SEATO and CENTO) with the same purpose in mind[13]. It winked over the rule by military dictators and did not pay much concern to their actions against ethnic minorities in Pakistan. The famously callous quote, “I wouldn't recognize the Balochistan problem, even if it hit me in the face!”[14] attributed to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is a sad reflection of that mindset—unfortunately this mindset continued through to the formation of Bangladesh and to the Baloch war of 1973.
The deliberate policy of Islamization by General Zia did not receive adequate attention because at that time the Iranian revolution was hogging the headlines. It has been the western perception that the Shia sect of Islam is more religiously inclined than the Sunni and is thus more prone to fanaticism—this was the historical experience in Iran and Lebanon. This was why Sunni dictators were placed in positions of power throughout the Middle-East—but this theorem was applied in a blanket manner to other countries and the dangers of Sunni extremism in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were ignored until it was too late. The Shia sect is indeed more religious but this devotion to the almighty extends into the spiritual realm—elements of mysticism are found in the sect and tolerance of the Sufi thought and acceptance of the teachings of wandering holy men is more pronounced among the Shia.
Sunni extremists on the other hand are more rigid and intolerant and have been known to destroy shrines and tombs of Islamic holy men. During the Afghan war of the 80s Afghan rebels and these Sunni groups were armed with advanced weaponry and trained in guerrilla warfare by American and Pakistani agencies. The local Afghan groups were encouraged to grow and sell opium to pay for these services while the foreign extremists received money from Arab potentates via the Muslim charities and aid organizations[15]. They also set up direct collection centres throughout Pakistan and raised money from the faithful by claiming that they were fighting a jihad—these tactics would be repeated in the proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan received over $3 billion in military and financial aid from the US while western leaders openly supported the concept of jihad[16] without understanding its implications for civilized societies—to fight the Evil Empire the Evil Alliance was born[17]! During this period the Baloch question was regarded as a threat to western interests especially when the Soviet Union began taking an interest in Baluchistan. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the Sunni extremists returned to their homes with weapons in their hands and the cry of jihad on their lips. The Pakistani groups were turned towards India while the Arab groups took on local dictators and their American backers—declaration of victory in Afghanistan had been premature and another problem was now dominating the civilized world’s concerns.
This period coincided with the Iraq War of 1990-91 and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Anxious to diversify its sources of oil the United States attempted to gain influence in the newly opened area of Central Asia. The oil and gas reserves could be best tapped by building pipelines and the shortest and most economical route lay through Iran—of course this option was rejected outright by the United States. They preferred to lay the pipelines in an east-west configuration either through the now democratic Russia or more enthusiastically through the NATO ally Turkey. By this time the Pakistanis had raised the Taliban to control Afghanistan by proxy and to spread their own footprint into the Muslim lands of Central Asia. A third route had now opened up and representatives of US oil companies began approaching the Taliban with proposals of building pipelines—in this period the US pushed the UN to provide funds to the Taliban for ending the production of drugs and itself gave aid to those extremists.
· By 2001 the Taliban were gone but the proposed pipelines still remained on the drawing board—however pipelines are only viable when they cater to a huge market economy that is able to pay big bucks for the oil and gas. For the east-west pipelines there is Europe on the one hand and China on the other—for the proposed north-south corridor there is only the rapidly burgeoning economy of India.
· To add to the American interest in the pipelines is the fact of Baluchistan’s own proven reserves that are yet to be tapped by western companies. Under Pakistani law wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign companies can take licenses to explore and prospect for oil and are also free to extract and sell that natural wealth. Western companies already in Baluchistan are BP, Eni, BHP, Ocean Energy Incorporated, Atlantic Richfield Corporation, Orient Petroleum, OMV, and Union Texas Pakistan.
· The rights of the local Baloch and the demands of the Sardars are only minor obstacles to these companies—the presence of the constituents of the International Islamic Front and the failure of Pakistan to rein in their activities is a standing threat to American interests.
· On their part the Americans too have kept their options open and have not condemned the Baloch militancy. A published report of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bluntly stated that Pakistan would face a Yugoslavia-like fate if it embarked on military operations against the Baloch[18].
China: Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize Communist China in 1950 in an attempt to diversify its international links[19]. Border tensions with India leading to the India-China war in 1962 made friendship with Pakistan even more important for the communist leadership. Pakistan ceded some land that it had annexed from the J&K princely state to China and the latter country began work on a highway that would cut through the mountains and provide a land link between the two friends. Pakistan also helped China in the international forums and enabled the communist nation to establish contacts with western-backed Islamic countries.
China provided open support to Pakistan during the latter’s wars with India in 1965 and in 1971—in fact during the Bangladesh war the US was also openly supporting Pakistan even as its army conducted a pogrom against Bengali Hindus and drove out millions of Bengalis into India. Pakistan enabled the US and China to make diplomatic contacts in this period and began receiving nuclear and missile components and technology from China. Through China Pakistan also opened contacts with North Korea and began exchanging its own nuclear technology with them in return for their missile technology.
Missile transfers by China were an attempt to leverage the Americans over the latter’s arming of Taiwan and the American design of placing missiles inside the lands of its East Asian allies[20]. However despite these hiccups both the US and China joined hands to support the Afghan rebels and Islamist groups against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan—blowback for China came in the shape of the Uighur separatists in the Xinjiang province bordering Pakistan and Central Asia. Some of these extremist Muslim rebels eventually became part of the International Islamic Front and found shelter with their brethren in Pakistan. China therefore temporarily blocked the Karakorum Highway connecting Pakistan with Xinjiang and began improving relations with India—but the communist country is too deeply involved with Pakistan to abandon it—especially after the events of September 11, 2001.
· China’s interests in Baluchistan stem from concerns that Uighur militants are being sheltered here by the International Islamic Front. 3 Chinese engineers were killed at Gwadar in May 2003 and though the Pakistanis blamed local Baloch rebels China was convinced that the attackers were Uighur extremists. In October 2003 the head of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) the Uighur Hasan Mahsum was killed in the tribal areas by the Pakistan Army[21]. China has increased its military contacts with Pakistan and for the first time conducted naval exercises and anti-terror exercises with its old ally.
· China operates the Saindak mines on lease and in the past has extracted several tons of copper and gold from the remote Baloch village[22]. Chinese companies are helping to build the Gwadar[23] port and the country is invested in that port to the tune of $200 million[24]. There is talk of gas pipelines being extended to China’s western provinces via Pakistan and of the possibility that trade between the Gulf countries and China could flow along the Pakistani highways and motorways.
· China competes with the US to gain influence over Pakistan in the economic and military spheres. At the moment the US with its bases in Baluchistan and Afghanistan and military presence in the Arabian Sea has the upper hand. An autonomous or independent Baluchistan would only serve to magnify American leverage over the countries in the region and would thus not be in China’s interests.
Russia: The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 did not end its influence in that country. In a clear contrast with the American experience in Vietnam the Soviet Embassy continued to function in Kabul and the communist government under Dr. Najibullah kept a hold over most of Afghanistan. Out of the collapse of the Soviet Union emerged a shaky but pro-western democratic Russia, which ended military and diplomatic support to Najibullah. Once the Pakistan-backed Taliban began sweeping through Afghanistan and some outrageous claims of a new Islamic Empire were bandied about, the Russians re-opened contacts with resistance groups from the Northern Alliance[25].
Through the decade of the 90s Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and India provided military, economic, and diplomatic support to the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups. Russia was keen to protect its assets and infrastructure in Central Asia from Islamist extremism and was looking to regain influence in that mineral-rich region. Another danger to Russia was the spread of Islamist extremism among the Muslim populations in the Caucasus region, particularly the Chechens. Thus the fall of the Taliban in 2001 was welcomed by Russia, which is now seeking to re-engage with the new rulers of Afghanistan.
· Russia’s interest in Baluchistan stems from its concern that Chechen extremists, as members of the International Islamic Front, have taken shelter in that province and in other parts of Pakistan.
· Russia has extensive goodwill and contacts among the older generation of the Baloch rebels and in an independent or federated Baluchistan Russia can leverage these contacts to benefit its companies. Russian oil companies in particular have plenty of capital and expertise, which will be gainfully employed in extracting Baluchistan’s untapped mineral wealth.Russia considers Iran an important ally and looks at that country to be its window to the markets of the Gulf and South Asia. It seeks to include Uzbekistan in that trade network and an independent Baluchistan can add its mineral wealth to service that network.
[1] See http://www.khyber.org/publications/001-005/afghanwarbenefitpak.shtml
[2] Talib is a student while Taliban is plural for Talib.
[3] See http://www.balochunity.org/index.php?history+&did=307
[4] See http://www.balochvoice.com/exploitation.html#Balochistan on sale once again
[5] See http://www.saag.org/index.html Unrest in Baluchistan (Paper no. 804) B Raman
[6] See The Mineral Industries of Afghanistan and Pakistan: Travis Q. Lyday for the U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook—2000
[7] See http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF2004/Weaver01/Weaver01.rtf
[8] See http://www.wakeupmag.co.uk/articles/ciadrugslaunder.htm
[9] See http://www.dawn.com/2001/05/07/fea.htm#5
[10] See http://members.fortunecity.com/balochistan/baloch/id11.html
[11] Prime Minister Shastri’s radio broadcast to the nation on September 3, 1965
[12] See http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/14guru.htm
[13] After a major shift in U.S. foreign policy strategy in 1954, Pakistan turned into a key state of the American containment strategy. Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of U. S. economic and military aid and was seen, at least temporarily, as Washington’s “most allied ally”. State Formation and Military in Pakistan: Boris Wilke
[14] From Dr. Ashok K Behuria’s article titled “The battle for Baluchistan” at http://www.asianaffairs.com/index.htm
[15] See http://www.khyber.org/publications/001-005/afghanwarbenefitpak.shtml
[16] “So, too, in Afghanistan, the freedom fighters are the key to peace. We support the Mujahidin.” President Ronald Reagan State of the Union Address, January 25 1988.
[17] As late as in 1998 the former NSA in the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, justified the formation of the evil alliance in the following words: “What was more important in the world view of history? A few stirred up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”— from Andrew Hartman, "The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan," Third World Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2002): 482.
[18] “Unchecked human rights abuses in Pakistan could similarly revive latent “fissiparous tendencies” particularly among the Baluch and Muhajir minorities, obliging Islamabad to divert resources from development to containing rural rebels and urban terrorists, at no small cost to Pakistan’s international reputation and relationships.” Cited in A Report from the CSIS Project Pakistan’s Future and U.S. Policy Options
[19] See http://www.country-studies.com/pakistan/china.html
[20] See http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/mpakpos.htm
[21] See http://www.asianaffairs.com/sep2004/china_pak.htm
[22] Dawn Features, 7 May 2001, Marked Shift in Centre’s Policy.
[23] China has pledged to develop its western regions including Xinjiang as part of its “Go West” policy. Xinjiang has demonstrated its economic potential by having registered $4.8 billion in foreign trade and $22.7 billion in GDP in 2003. Seeking to capitalize on Xinjiang’s rising fortunes and strengthen Sino-Pakistani economic ties; Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz vocally called for expanding trade links with Xinjiang and offered the Gwadar port’s services for facilitating trade during the Governor of Xinjiang’s October 2004 visit to Pakistan. Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port - Ziad Haider Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.
[24] See http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper259.html
[25] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign%20relations%20of%20Afghanistan
